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Third Circuit Review
THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES: JUSTICE
FOR ALL OR JUSTICE FOR A FEW?
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) were enacted
in November, 1987.1 The Guidelines were promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission (Commission) pursuant to The Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984.2 The basic purpose of the Guidelines was to
implement a fair sentencing system while avoiding wide disparity in sen-
tencing.3 The Guidelines provide a prescribed range and degree of
punishment that is calculated by analyzing both the characteristics of the
offense and the offender. 4 Although a judge must usually stay within the
prescribed range, he or she may depart from that range if there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance which has not already been ade-
quately considered -by the Commission. 5 In deciding whether the Com-
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86 (1988); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FED-
ERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter SENTENCING
GUIDELINES]; Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines And The Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1 (1988) ("Since November 1987,
the new Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been law.").
The Sentencing Guidelines have survived constitutional attack. The Sen-
tencing Guidelines were challenged as unconstitutional in United States v. Mis-
tretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). In Mistretta, the United States Supreme Court held
that Congress did not violate the separation of powers doctrine even though the
United States Sentencing Commission [hereinafter Sentencing Commission]
was placed in the judicial branch, where sentencing had traditionally been de-
cided by judges. Id. at 385-89. The United States Supreme Court also held that
Congress, by granting the Sentencing Commission the authority to promulgate
the Guidelines, did not violate the non-delegation doctrine, because Congress
had provided "significant statutory direction." Id. at 412. The Court noted that
this "intricate, labor intensive task" is of the kind for which delegation to the
Sentencing Commission is appropriate. Id. at 379.
2. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1976 (1984) (codified as amended in relevant parts at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86, 28
U.S.C. § 991-998 (1988)). For a discussion of the composition of the Sentenc-
ing Commission, see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
3. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, note 1, ch. 1, pt. A(3) (policy statement).
For a discussion of prior wide disparity in sentencing, see Breyer, supra note 1, at
4-6; Ogeltree, The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
101 HARv. L. REV. 1938, 1940-51 (1988); Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of
1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 86 (1988).
4. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A(2) (policy statement).
For a further discussion of how the sentencing range is calculated, see infra
notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). The complete text of § 3553(b) provides:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,
(877)
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mission adequately considered a circumstance, the judge must rely
entirely on "the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Commission." '6
Federal courts are divided on the issue of whether an individual's
efforts to overcome drug addiction constitutes a mitigating circumstance
which would warrant a downward departure from the appropriate sen-
tencing range. 7 To decide this issue, a judge must determine whether
the Commission "adequately" considered an individual's efforts to over-
come drug addiction when it promulgated the Guidelines. 8 If the Com-
mission has adequately considered drug rehabilitation, then it is not a
mitigating circumstance which would warrant a downward departure
from the prescribed sentencing range.9 If the Commission failed to con-
sider or did not adequately consider drug rehabilitation, however, then
it would constitute a mitigating circumstance whereby a judge would be
referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different
from that described. In determining whether a circumstance was ade-
quately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sen-
tencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the
Sentencing Commission. In the absence of an applicable sentencing
guideline, the court shall impose an appropriate sentence, having due
regard for the purposes set forth in subsection (a)(2). In the absence of
an applicable sentencing guideline in the case of an offense other than a
petty offense, the court shall also have due regard for the relationship
of the sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines applica-
ble to similar offenses and offenders, and to the applicable policy state-
ments of the Sentencing Commission.
Id. This article does not address aggravating circumstances in which an upward
departure from the applicable sentence range might be warranted.
6. Id.
7. United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1990) (post-con-
viction drug rehabilitation not proper grounds for downward departure when
defendant convicted of selling eight stolen United States Treasury checks and
possession of stolen mail), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991); United States v.
Van Dyke, 895 F.2d 984, 987 (4th Cir. 1990) (post-conviction drug rehabilita-
tion is not proper grounds for downward departure when defendant convicted
of possession of heroin with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 112
(1990). Contra United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 816-18 (6th Cir. 1989)
(judge has discretion to depart downward from Sentencing Guidelines based on
drug rehabilitation when defendant convicted of armed robbery); United States
v. Harrington, 741 F. Supp. 968 (D.D.C. 1990) (evidence defendant successfully
participated in drug treatment program warranted downward departure when
defendant convicted of distribution and possession of cocaine); United States v.
Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Minn. 1990) (drug rehabilitation considered factor
which justified downward departure when defendant convicted of distribution of
cocaine); United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (drug
rehabilitation one factor which warranted downward departure when defendant
convicted of selling crack).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
9. Id. For the full text of § 3553(b), see supra, note 5.
878 (Vol. 36: p. 877
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss3/6
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
justified in issuing a sentence below the prescribed range.' 0
In United States v. Pharr, I I the Third Circuit held that drug rehabili-
tation did not constitute a mitigating circumstance because the Commis-
sion had adequately considered an individual's efforts at drug
rehabilitation when it promulgated the Guidelines. Therefore, accord-
ing to the court, drug rehabilitation did not warrant a downward depar-
ture. 12 In reaching this conclusion, the Pharr court relied on a policy
statement set forth in the Guidelines forbiding a downward departure
based on drug dependence or alcohol abuse.13 The court further relied
on a Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Mejia-Orosco, for the proposition
that Congress intended that the Guidelines represent a shift "away from
a system that attempts to rehabilitate the individual."1 4 The Pharr court
relied upon this underlying objective in reaching the conclusion that
drug rehabilitation is not a circumstance which would allow a district
court to depart from the appropriate sentencing range.15
This author submits that, contrary to the holding of the Pharr court,
the Commission did not adequately consider drug rehabilitation as a
mitigating circumstance. Furthermore, this Brief will explain why the
Pharr court's analysis of underlying objectives and policy statements16 is
contrary to the language of both The Sentencing Reform Act and the
Guidelines.' 7 In essence, the Pharr court attempted to predict what the
Commission would have done had it considered drug rehabilitation
rather than properly analyze whether the Commission had actually con-
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
11. 916 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2274 (1991).
12. Id. at 130, 133.
13. Id. at 133. The policy statement relied on by the Third Circuit provides
in part: "Drug dependence or alcohol abuse is not a reason for imposing a sen-
tence below the guidelines." SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H,
§ 5HI.4 (policy statement). The court interpreted this policy statement "to
mean that [both] dependence upon drugs, or separation from such a dependency"
prohibit a downward departure. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133 (emphasis added).
14. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132 (citing United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d
216, 218 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989)). For a discussion of
the facts and rationale behind Mejia-Orosco, see infra notes 51, 53, 89-101 and
accompanying text.
15. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132.
16. Policy statements, while not binding on the courts, are promulgated by
the Commission and may be considered in deciding whether a circumstance war-
rants departure from the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see generally
SENTENCING GUIDELINES supra note 1. For a discussion of the Pharr court's anal-
ysis of policy statements, see infra notes 50, 58-63, 116-139 and accompanying
text.
17. For a discussion of why underlying objectives are not pertinent to de-
ciding whether a mitigating circumstance exists which would warrant a down-
ward departure, see infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of why. the policy statements relied upon by the Pharr court are contrary to both
Congress's and the Commission's intent, see infra notes 116-139 and accompa-
nying text.
1991] 879
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sidered drug rehabilitation when it promulgated the Guidelines in the
first place.
II. BACKGROUND
Before detailing the Pharr court's analysis, it should be noted that
the United States Supreme Court has provided only limited review as to
how the Guidelines are to be applied.' 8 The Guidelines, however, are
quite detailed and provide a comprehensive system of analysis. 19 In en-
acting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,20 Congress's main purpose
was to reduce the wide disparity in sentencing that existed in the federal
courts. 2 1 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established the United
States Sentencing Commission as "an independent Commission in the
judicial branch" which consists of seven members, three of whom are
active federal judges. 22 The Commission was charged with promulgat-
ing The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 23 according to Congress's
instructions. 2 4
18. There have been only three United States Supreme Court cases which
have involved the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Taylor v. United States, 110
S. Ct. 2143 (1990) ("burglary" for sentencing enhancement purposes refers to
any crime having basic elements of burglary); Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct.
265 (1989) (denying certiorari but Justice Stevens' concurrence criticized Fifth
Circuit for allowing efficient management to displace careful administration ofjustice); United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (seminal case holding
Sentencing Guidelines constitutional, not violative of separation of powers doc-
trine and not an excessive delegation of legislative power).
19. See generally SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1.
20. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1988)). The Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984 is a chapter of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in relevant parts 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-86, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988)).
21. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3221; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988); 28
U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (1988). SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at ch. 1, pt.
A-5 (Sentencing Guidelines "will cure wide disparity"). For a discussion of the
wide disparity in federal sentencing, see Breyer, supra note 1, at 4-6; Ogletree,
supra note 3, at 1944-47.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988). The Commissioners are appointed by the
President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate. Id. Each Commis-
sioner serves for a term of six years. Id. § 992(a). He or she may be removed by
the President for neglect of duty, malfeasance or other good cause. Id. § 991 (a).
"The Attorney General and the Chairman of the U.S. Parole Commission are ex-
officio, non-voting members." Id. Furthermore, no more than four members of
the Commission may be members of the same political party. Id.
23. For an account of Congress's instructions, see Ogletree, supra note 3, at
1946-47. Congress, however, provided "only very general direction[s]" to the
Commission regarding the "content and structure of the guidelines." Weigel,
supra note 3, at 85.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988). The task of promulgating such Sentencing
Guidelines was monumental. The original Commission considered over
100,000 federal criminal cases. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT OF THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATE-
4
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The Commission, as a permanent body, is charged with the periodic
revision of the Guidelines.2 5 "Thus, the system is 'evolutionary, '26 -
the Commission issues Guidelines, gathers data from actual practice,
analyzes the data, and revises the Guidelines over time."'2 7
The mechanical application of the Guidelines is quite simple. A
sentencing judge assigns values to different factors which correspond to
the behavior of the defendant exhibited during the criminal activity, as
MENTS 16-17 (1987). Over 10,000 of the criminal cases were detailed reports.
Id. at 11; Breyer, supra note 1, at 7-8. The Commission completed a preliminary
draft of the Guidelines in September, 1986 and distributed it to thousands of
individuals, organizations and government agencies in order to elicit analysis for
comment. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N GUIDELINES PRELIMINARY DRAFr, 40 Crim.
L. Rep. (BNA) 3001 (Oct. 1, 1986). The Commission revised the guidelines to
correct the multitude of problems pointed out by commentators. UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE INITIAL SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 11 (1987). Judge Edward R. Becker
expressed concern that the preliminary federal Sentencing Guidelines would
lead to the same disparity in sentencing that the Sentencing Guidelines were
trying to correct. Ogletree, supra note 3, at 1949 n.67; see also Sentencing Commis-
sion's First Effort Receives Outpouring of Criticism, 40 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2223-28
(Dec. 17, 1986) (many commentators critical of first draft of Sentencing Guide-
lines partly because of possibility of wide disparity not being corrected). While
the Commission met the congressional deadline, it sent the final draft to Con-
gress along with a request to postpone putting the Guidelines into effect pend-
ing additional field testing. Sentencing Commission Sends Guidelines to Congress, 41
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1009 (Apr. 15, 1987). Many commentators thought the
Sentencing Guidelines required additional revisions. Sentencing Commission 's Sec-
ond Draft Meets with More Approval Than First, 40 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2487-92
(March 25, 1987) (additional "field test[ing]" of Sentencing Guidelines by
judges desirable); Ogletree, supra note 3, at 1949 (second draft that "received
extensive criticism" rushed through to meet "congressional deadline").
25. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), (p) (1988); SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1,
ch. 1, pt. A-5 ("Commission is a permanent body that may amend" the "imper-
fect" Sentencing Guidelines each year).
26. Congress as well as the Commission realized that the Guidelines were
not perfect and would require constant revision which could only be accom-
plished effectively by analyzing data and comments from judges, scholars and
other commentators. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988); SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 1, ch. 1 pt. A.
27. Breyer, supra note 1, at 8. Judge Breyer states that "the Commission by
and large, followed typical past practice" in "creating categories and determin-
ing sentence lengths." Id. at 7. Judge Breyer explains that while " 'past prac-
tice' and 'evolutionary' are merely slogans, . . . they may offer guidance to the
user in understanding how the Commission approached its task." Id. at 8. For a
discussion of how the Sentencing Commission used "past practice," specifically
past federal criminal cases, in promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines, see supra
note 17 and accompanying text. The Sentencing Guidelines have been revised
to some extent each year following the adoption of the original 1987 guidelines.
See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL (1988); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1990); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1991). Each year the Sentencing Commission
evaluates data and commentary of the previous year's Sentencing Guidelines to
amend them as the Sentencing Commission sees fit. Breyer, supra note 1 at 7-9.
5
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well as to the defendant's criminal history.2 8 These values are then to-
talled to generate two numbers: 29 the total offense level30 and the crim-
inal history category. 3' These two numbers are then applied to a
"Sentencing Grid" which produces a minimum and maximum sentenc-
ing range.3 2 The judge may depart from this range if "there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Commission .... ,,33 It was
28. Weigel, supra note 3, at 86. The Guidelines require the sentencingjudge to assign numerical weight to numerous aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors relating to the conduct attending the offense committed and the defend-
ant's criminal history. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. B, § IB1.I (application
instructions). The total offense level represents the numerical calculation relat-
ing to offense conduct. Id. The criminal history category represents the calcula-
tion relating to the defendant's past criminal activities. Id.
32. Id.; Weigel, supra note 3, at 86. These two numerical results, which in-
tersect on a Sentencing Table, "determine a Sentencing Range delineating a
minimum and maximum number of months of imprisonment." Weigel, supra
note 3, at 86; see SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. B § IB1.I (ap-
plication instructions). Generally, the maximum sentencing range may not ex-
ceed the minimum range by twenty-five percent. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). Chronologically, the Sentencing Guide-
lines are applied in the following manner. First, the particular crime must be
looked up in the applicable section of Chapter Two. SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. B, § IB 1.1(a) (application instructions). Second, the base
offense level and specific offense characteristics for that particular crime must be
found in Chapter Two. Id. ch. 1, pt. B, § 1BI.I (b). Third, levels are added or
subtracted from the base offense level for specific offense characteristics. Id. ch.
1, pt. B, § IBI. 1 (b). Fourth, adjustments referenced in Chapter Three, relating
to the victim, role and obstruction of justice are applied. Id. Parts A, B and C
from Chapter Three each refer to different factual circumstances which may
have surrounded the criminal activity and each section may apply. Id. For in-
stance, Chapter Three, Part A deals with whether the victim was unusually vul-
nerable, an officer of the law, or physically restrained in the course of the
offense. Id. ch. 3, pt. A, § 3A. Part B deals with the defendant's aggravating,
mitigating role in the crime. Id. ch. 3, pt. B, § 3B. Part C deals with the defend-
ant's obstruction of justice and risk of death or harm to others in flight from
crime. Id. ch. 3, pt. C, § 3C. Fifth, the computation is adjusted to reflect the
defendant's acceptance of responsibility pursuant to Chapter Three, Part E. Id.
ch. 1, pt. B, § IBl.l(e). Sixth, the criminal history category is determined as
specified by Chapter Four, Part A and adjustments are made to it by using Chap-
ter Four, Part B. Id. ch. 1, pt. B, § 1BL.I(O. Adjustments are made upwards
when the defendant is a career offender or engaged in criminal conduct as a
livelihood. Id. ch. 4, pt. B, § 4B1.1-1.4; see id. ch. 1, pt. B, § IB1.1(f). Seventh,
the guideline range is determined by combining the offense level and criminal
history category previously calculated pursuant to Chapter Five, Part A. Id. ch.
1, pt. B, § IBl.l(g). The sentencing requirements and options (for example,
probation, imprisonment, supervision conditions, fines and restitution) related
to the particular guideline range are set forth in Chapter Five, Parts B-G. Id. ch.
1, pt. B, § 1Bl.1(h). Finally, reference to Chapter 5, Parts H and K determines if
any departure or additional considerations are warranted. Id. ch. 1, pt. B,
§ 1B 1.1 (i). Note that if there are multiple counts of conviction, additional calcu-
lations are necessary. Id. ch. 1, pt. B, § IB 1.1(d). Chapter Three, Part D deter-
6
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this issue that ultimately brought Stanley Pharr before the Third Circuit.
III. UNITED STATES V. PHARR
In 1988, Stanley Pharr sold stolen United States Treasury checks to
an undercover agent on four different occasions. 34 Later that year,
Pharr sold a stolen United States money order and attempted to sell a
stolen School District of Philadelphia check to the same undercover
agent.3 5 The total face value of the checks involved was $4,565.66.36
According to Pharr, his heroin "addiction motivated him to sell [the]
stolen treasury checks."13 7 Pursuant to a plea bargain arrangement en-
tered into on October 18, 1989, Pharr agreed to admit his involvement
in each of these transactions.3 8 He pled guilty to one count of selling
stolen Treasury checks and one count of possession of stolen mail.3 9
Stanley Pharr then entered an inpatient drug rehabilitation program,
which he successfully completed. 40
The appropriate sentencing range for Pharr's crimes under the
Guidelines was fifteen to twenty-one months imprisonment. 4 1 The dis-
trict court, however, noted that Pharr was making "conscientious ef-
forts" to rehabilitate himself and "overcome a pernicious habit." 42
mines how these multiple convictions are calculated into the offense level. Id.
ch. 3, pt. B, § 3BI.1-3DI.5. For a specific example of how the Sentencing
Guidelines are applied, see Breyer, supra note 1, at 6-7 (describing how defend-
ant with bank robbery conviction and one prior offense would be sentenced us-
ing guidelines).
34. Brief for Appellant at 4, United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.
1990) (No. 90-1284).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130; Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. Pharr,
916 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1284). The facts in Pharr were not dis-
puted. See Brief for Appellant at 4-7, United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129 (3d
Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1284) (United States Attorney's office did not dispute any
facts asserted by defendant); see also Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130-31 (no discussion of
factual dispute; only legal question was whether downward departure was war-
ranted for drug rehabilitation).
38. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130.
39. Id. The two criminal statutes that were violated are 18 U.S.C. § 510(b)
(1988) (sale of stolen United States Treasury checks) and 18 U.S.C. § 1708
(1988) (possession of stolen mail).
40. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130; Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. Pharr,
916 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1284).
41. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130. This Brief will focus on whether a downward
departure from the sentencing range for drug rehabilitation is warranted once
the sentencing range is calculated. This Brief will not focus on the mechanics of
calculating the appropriate sentencing range. However, for a rudimentary over-
view of how the sentencing range is calculated under the Guidelines, see supra
notes 22-26 and accompanying text. See also Breyer, supra note 1, at 6-7; Weigel,
supra note 3, at 89-92.
42. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130; Brief for Appellant at 6, United States v. Pharr,
916 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1284).
1991] 883
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Moreover, the district court found that the Commission, when promul-
gating the Guidelines, did not adequately consider a defendant's drug
rehabilitation or the effect that incarceration would have on such reha-
bilitation. 43 The district court, therefore, believed that it had the au-
thority to depart downward from the fifteen to twenty-one month
sentencing range. 44 Accordingly, the district court sentenced Pharr to
five years probation. 45
The government appealed contending that post-conviction rehabili-
tation had been adequately considered by the Commission and there-
fore was not a valid basis for a downward departure from the
Guidelines.4 6 On appeal, 4 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit agreed with the government's argument and reversed the
district court's ruling.4 8 The Third Circuit based its holding on the "un-
derlying objectives of the sentencing guidelines and the policy state-
ments articulated by the Commission." '4 9
43. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130; Brief for Appellant at 6, United States v. Pharr,
916 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1284). The district court believed that the
drug treatment in prison was inadequate and would have a detrimental effect on
Pharr's overall drug rehabilitation. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130. The district court
explained that while the Guidelines discuss addiction as an unacceptable de-
fense, they do not address whether separation from an addiction may be a miti-
gating circumstance which would warrant a downward departure. Brief for
Appellant at 6-7, United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-
1284). The district court held that the community would be ill-served if a down-
ward departure was not permitted. Id. at 6-7. The district court also expressed
concern over treating "flesh and blood" as calculi. Id. Rather, the court favored
treating individual defendants separately and believed the Sentencing Guide-
lines were perhaps inadequate to some degree. Id. In this case, therefore, the
court believed that in order for justice to be served, a sentence lower than the
applicable sentencing range was necessary. Id.
44. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130, 133.
45. Id. at 130. Stanley Pharr was sentenced to five years probation on each
count. Id. Both sentences were to be served concurrently. Id. Under the dis-
trict court's sentence, Pharr was ordered to pay $50 assessment on each count
and $1200 restitution payable over the next three years. Id.
46. Id. at 131. For a discussion of how a mitigating factor may be grounds
for a downward departure, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
47. The Third Circuit's review of a district court's determination that the
Sentencing Guidelines have or have not adequately considered a particular miti-
gating circumstance is plenary. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 131 (citing United States v.
Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 786
(3d Cir. 1989)). Whether a particular mitigating circumstance may warrant a
downward departure is therefore a question of law, which is also subject to ple-
nary review. Id. (citing United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 177 (1989)).
48. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130, 132-33. The Pharr court held that a defendant's
post-conviction drug rehabilitation had been adequately considered by the Sen-
tencing Commission and therefore would not constitute grounds for a down-
ward departure from the appropriate sentencing range. Id.
49. Id. at 132.
[Vol. 36: p. 877
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Writing on behalf of a unanimous Third Circuit panel,50 Judge
Cowen began his analysis with the assertion that Congress's authoriza-
tion of the Guidelines was in fact a shift away from a rehabilitative sys-
tem and towards a system that attempts to impose a fair punishment for
each crime, rather than for each criminal. 5 1 The court explained that
Congress had previously mandated "that personal characteristics should
not ordinarily affect sentencing."'52
The Third Circuit further stated that, because of the shift away from
rehabilitation, a district court has limited discretion in sentencing and
must adhere to the Guidelines whether or not.it agrees with Congress's
theory of penology. 53 The Pharr court asserted that the Commission
"rejected purely personal characteristics" such as drug rehabilitation. 54
Yet, the court recognized that Congress did not absolutely foreclose all
consideration of all of a defendant's characteristics. 5 5 Rather, the per-
sonal characteristics that may be considered by a district court are lim-
ited to those that the Commission decides are related to the defendant
as a criminal. 56
50. Id. at 130. The panel consisted of Judges Stapleton, Cowen and Weis.
Id.
51. Id. at 132. The Third Circuit relied on United States v. Mejia-Orosco,
867 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3257 (1989). Pharr, 916 F.2d
at 132. In Mia-Orosco, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Con-
gress had decided that the maxim "the punishment should fit the offender and
not merely the crime... [has] proven unworkable and unjust." Mejia-Orosco, 867
F.2d at 218 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)). Further-
more, the court stated that predictions of "an offender's propensity for, or ac-
tual rehabilitation were found to be unsubstantiated." Id. Therefore, a system
based upon the parole official's determination of a prisoner's rehabilitation was
undesirable. Id. The court concluded that "[t]he main purpose of imprison-
ment is punishment" and consequently, "the punishment should fit the crime,"
not the criminal. Id.
52. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988)).
53. Id. (citing Moia-Orosco, 867 F.2d at 218-19; United States v. Lopez, 875
F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir. 1989)).
54. Id. at 133 (citing SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H,
§ 5H1.3 (policy statement)).
55. Id. at 132.
56. Id. at 132-33. Congress "instructed the Sentencing Commission, not
the courts, to determine whether various personal characteristics should be con-
sidered in sentencing." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988)). The text of
§ 994(d) provides:
(d) The Commission in establishing categories of defendants for use in
the guidelines and policy statements governing the imposition of
sentences of probation, a fine, or imprisonment, governing the imposi-
tion of other authorized sanctions, governing the size of a fine or the
length of a term of probation, imprisonment, or supervised release, and
governing the conditions of probation, supervised release, or imprison-
ment, shall consider whether the following matters, among others, with
respect to a defendant, have any relevance to the nature, extent, place
of service or other [incidence] of an appropriate sentence, and shall
take them into account only to the extent that they do have relevance-
(1) age;
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The Third Circuit next relied upon a policy statement accompany-
ing the Guidelines which provides that "[d]rug dependence or alcohol
abuse is not a reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines."15 7
It opined that these prohibitions mean that drug dependence, as well as
a separation from such a dependence, is not a basis for a downward
departure.5 8
Although the Third Circuit stated that the Commission could not
consider every potential factor that might warrant a departure from the
(2) education;
(3) vocational skills;
(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that such condition
mitigates the defendant's culpability or to the extent that such condi-
tion is otherwise plainly relevant;
(5) physical condition, including drug dependence;
(6) previous employment record;
(7) family ties and responsibilities;
(8) community ties;
(9) role in the offense;
(10) criminal history; and
(11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (footnote omitted).
57. Pharr, at 133; SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H,
§ 5HI.4 (policy statement). The text of the policy statement provides:
Physical condition is not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines or where within
the guidelines a sentence should fall. However, an extraordinary physi-
cal impairment may be a reason to impose a sentence other than
imprisonment.
Drug dependence or alcohol abuse is not a reason for imposing a
sentence below the guidelines. Substance abuse is highly correlated to
an increased propensity to commit crime. Due to this increased risk, it
is highly recommended that a defendant who is incarcerated also be
sentenced to supervised release with a requirement that the defendant
participate in an appropriate substance abuse program. If participation
in a substance abuse program is required, the length of supervised re-
lease should take into account the length of time necessary for the su-
pervisory body to judge the success of the program.
This provision would also apply in cases where the defendant re-
ceived a sentence of probation. The substance abuse condition is
strongly recommended and the length of probation should be adjusted
accordingly. Failure to comply would normally result in revocation of
probation.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H, § 5H1.4.
58. Parr, 916 F.2d at 133. The policy statement upon which the court re-
lied explicitly addresses only a dependence on drugs. For the text of SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES, ch. 5, pt. H, § 5HI.4, see supra note 57. However, the Third
Circuit read the policy statement as also prohibiting downward departures based
on drug rehabilitation (or a separation from drug dependence). Pharr, 916 F.2d
at 133. Additionally, the Third Circuit expressed concern that a downward de-
parture under such circumstances would be tantamount to rewarding defend-
ants for being addicted to drugs at the time they commit a crime. Id. ("Along
with being rewarded for overcoming their drug dependency, defendants would
be rewarded, in a sense, for being addicted.").
886 [Vol. 36: p. 877
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Guidelines, 5 9 the court opined that the Commission had considered and
had rejected "factors such as the defendant's efforts to improve himself
through drug rehabilitation. ' 60 Two factors that had been specifically
rejected were the defendant's efforts to "improve himself through edu-
cation or his ability to maintain steady employment."' 6 1 Judge Cowen
stated that Pharr's efforts at drug rehabilitation were analogous to the
above factors already rejected by the Commission. 6 2
Finally, the court concluded that any effect that imprisonment
might have on Pharr's efforts to-rehabilitate himself would also be inap-
propriate grounds for a downward departure. 63 This conclusion was
also based on the notion that Congress intended to shift away from a
rehabilitative system.6 The court stated that allowing a district court to
consider any effect incarceration may have on Pharr's drug rehabilita-
tion efforts would work to undermine Congress's alleged purpose be-
hind the Guidelines. 6 5
In reaching the above conclusions, the Third Circuit chose not to
rely on the Fourth Circuit opinion in United States v. Van Dyke.66 The
government had relied upon Van Dyke in support of its proposition that
the Commission considered a defendant's drug rehabilitation, at least
when the defendant was convicted of a "drug-related offense."'6 7 The
59. Id. at 133 (citing SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. K,
§ 5K2.0 (policy statement)).
60. Id. (citing SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H, §§ 5H1.2,
5H1.5 (policy statements)). For the text of these policy statements, see infra.
note 133.
61. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133 (citing SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch.
5, pt. H, §§ 5H1.2, 5H1.5 (policy statements)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. ("Allowing the district court to consider the effect of incarceration
on a defendant's drug rehabilitation efforts would undermine the purpose of the
guidelines"; the alleged purpose was a shift away from a rehabilitative system).
66. United States v. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d 984, 987 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 112 (1990).
67. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 131-32; Brief for Appellant at 9-10, United States v.
Pharr, 916 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1284). The United States Attorney's
Office relied on Van Dyke to assert that post-conviction drug rehabilitation is a
factor that was considered by the Commission under the acceptance of responsi-
bility adjustment and therefore was an appropriate ground for downward depar-
ture. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 131-32. The court in Van Dyke held that any drug
rehabilitation efforts were addressed by the Sentencing Commission in provid-
ing for a two level reduction in the offense level (used for calculating sentencing
range) if the defendant accepts responsibility for his actions. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d
at 986-87. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that no departure was warranted
as the Commission had adequately considered these circumstances. Id.; Pharr,
916 F.2d at 132. A "drug-related offense" for purposes of this Brief means of-
fenses involving actual illegal drugs and not offenses which were committed due
to a dependence on drugs.
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court in Van Dyke held that, by providing for a two level reduction, 68 if
the defendant accepted responsibility for his actions, the Commission
had adequately considered any drug rehabilitation efforts by the defend-
ant.69 This proposition is limited to cases where the defendant is con-
victed of a drug-related offense, because drug rehabilitation would only
qualify for acceptance of responsibility in drug-related offenses. 70 The
Third Circuit, therefore, did not consider this proposition applicable to
the facts of Pharr's case, since he did not commit a drug-related
offense. 7 1
68. For a discussion of reduction of offense levels for acceptance of respon-
sibility, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
69. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d at 986-87; Pharr, 916 F.2d at 131-32; Brief for Ap-
pellant at 8-9, United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1284).
The acceptance of responsibility provision allows a reduction of two levels in the
defendant's offense level if he "clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirma-
tive acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct." SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 3, pt. E, § 3El.l(a). The commentary to the
Guidelines provides a relevant but not exhaustive list of factors to be used in
determining whether the defendant is entitled to a reduction:
(a) voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or
associations;
(b) voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt;
(c) voluntary and truthful admission to authorities of involvement in
the offense and related conduct;
(d) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after commission of
the offense;
(e) voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruits and
instrumentalities of the offense;
(0 voluntary resignation from the office or position held during the
commission of the offense; and
(g) the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the accept-
ance of responsibility.
Id. ch. 3, pt. E, § 3El.1 (commentary: application notes).
70. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 131.
71. Id. at 132. The rationale underlying the Van Dyke case is that drug reha-
bilitation is analogous to acceptance of responsibility for a crime involving
drugs. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d at 986-87. Therefore, drug rehabilitation has already
been taken into consideration by the Commission. Id. This proposition is only
applicable, however, when the defendant is convicted of a drug-related offense.
In Van Dyke, the defendant was convicted of "drug-related offenses," but Stanley
Pharr was not convicted of "drug-related offenses." Van Dyke, 895 F.2d at 985
(defendant convicted for possession of heroin); Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130. "While
Pharr may have been motivated by his drug addiction, the offense for which he
was actually sentenced [was] not drug related." Pharr, 916 F.2d at 130. (For a
discussion of the crimes committed by Stanley Pharr, see supra notes 34-40 and
accompanying text.) As a result, the Third Circuit decided that Van Dyke was
inapplicable to the issues presented in Pharr. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132. The Pharr
court did not decide whether drug rehabilitation is encompassed within the ac-
ceptance of responsibility provision under Sentencing Guidelines Section 3E 1.1
when sentencing a defendant for a drug-related offense. Id.
Note that the Pharr court did not state that a defendant who committed a
drug-related offense might be entitled to have the district court consider a possi-
ble downward departure for any drug rehabilitation. Id. It is arguable that Pharr
may bar any downward departure for drug rehabilitation whether a drug-related
[Vol. 36: p. 877888
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Lastly, it should be noted that the Third Circuit openly acknowl-
edged contrary decisions of other courts.72 Specifically, the Third Cir-
cuit noted that the Sixth Circuit, as well as several district courts, was in
disagreement with the conclusions the Third Circuit reached in Pharr.7 3
Notwithstanding these contrary holdings, the Pharr court did not allow
Stanley Pharr's drug rehabilitation to warrant a downward departure
from the Guidelines. 74
IV. ANALYSIS
This Brief submits that, contrary to the Pharr court's findings, the
Commission did not address the issue of whether drug rehabilitation
justifies a downward departure from the appropriate sentencing range.
Consequently, the district court should have the discretion to decide
whether drug rehabilitation is a mitigating circumstance that may war-
rant a downward departure from the applicable sentencing range. 75 It is
alternately submitted that the Guidelines are, at best, ambiguous on the
issue of whether a defendant's drug rehabilitation should be considered
a mitigating circumstance which would enable a district court to depart
from the Guidelines. 76 When a criminal statute is ambiguous, the
offense or not. However, in a drug-related offense, any drug rehabilitation may
relate to the defendant's characteristics as a criminal and consequently may enti-
tle him to a downward departure. An obstacle to this consideration would be
that, according to the Third Circuit, only the Sentencing Commission may delin-
eate characteristics to be considered. Id. at 132-33. In any event, the Third
Circuit implied that its ruling might have been different if Stanley Pharr had
committed a drug-related offense. Id. at 132. At a minimum, the Pharr court
refused to endorse or reject the premise upon which Van Dyke rests. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. In State v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1989), the court held
that a downward departure was warranted for the defendant's drug rehabilita-
tion. Id. at 816-18. In Maddalena, the defendant was convicted of armed rob-
bery. Id. at 816. Therefore, the concerns that the Third Circuit had with Van
Dyke and drug-related offenses were not applicable. Although several district
courts have held that drug rehabilitation warrants a downward departure, the
defendants in those cases were convicted of drug-related offenses. See United
States v. Harrington, 741 F. Supp. 968 (D.D.C. 1990) (distribution and posses-
sion of cocaine); United States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Minn. 1990)
(distribution of cocaine and drug rehabilitation only one factor in justifying
downward departure); United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (distribution of crack cocaine). For a further discussion of these cases
allowing a downward departure for drug rehabilitation, see supra note 7 and ac-
companying text.
74. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132.
75. Maddalena, 893 F.2d at 818 (district court may consider departure when
defendant made effort to stay away from drugs). For a discussion of how miti-
gating factors may be grounds for departure from the appropriate sentencing
range, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
76. Given the wide disparity of opinion in the federal circuit and district
courts, this conclusion seems justified. For a list of differing opinions in the
federal courts on the issue of whether drug rehabilitation may warrant a down-
ward departure see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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United States Supreme Court has stated that any ambiguity must "be
resolved in favor of lenity."'7 7 "This policy embodies 'the instinctive dis-
taste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly
said they should.' S78
The Pharr court's decision is inadequate for three reasons. First,
the court's reliance on underlying objectives 79 is contrary to the clear
statutory language of both Congress and the Commission regarding
those sources which a court may consider when it decides whether a
circumstance warrants a departure from the Guidelines.80 Second, the
court's assertion that the personal characteristics of a defendant should
not be taken into consideration 8 ' ignores statutory language and case
77. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) ("ambiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity" (quoting
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971))). The Supreme Court has
noted that this rule of lenity should not "override common sense and evident
statutory purpose." United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145 (1975) (quoting
United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948)). The fact that no consensus has
been reached supports the conclusion that the Guidelines must be somewhat
ambiguous. For a discussion of differing decisions on whether drug rehabilita-
tion warrants a downward departure, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
The ambiguity would support application of leniency to Pharr without "over-
rid[ing] [any] common sense and evident statutory purpose." Moore, 423 U.S. at
145 (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948)). For a discussion
of the different circuit and district courts' interpretations of whether drug reha-
bilitation is grounds for a downward departure, see supra note 7 and accompany-
ing text. To assert that this rule of lenity overrides common sense or evident
statutory purpose, the assumption must be made that judges from the United
States Courts of Appeals, as well as several district court judges, either have no
common sense or are unable to identify evident statutory purpose. (This author
is not prepared to make either of these assumptions.) For a discussion of deci-
sions contrary to Pharr in the circuit and district courts, see supra notes 73-75
and accompanying text.
78. United States v. Speight, 726 F. Supp. 861, 867 (D.D.C. 1989) (quoting
H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 209 (1967) (emphasis added)); United States v.
Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The United States Supreme
Court has spoken early and often in cases where criminal statutes are ambigu-
ous. See, e.g., Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 ("[a]mbiguity in a criminal statute... [should
be] resolved in favor of the defendant"); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808,
812 (1971) ("[ajmbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity" (citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955));
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955) ("It may be fairly said to be a pre-
supposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code
against the imposition of a harsher punishment."). Admittedly, all of these cases
involve defining criminal conduct and not sentencing. However, the "instinctive
distastes against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said
they should" is an underlying concern and should equally apply to sentencing.
See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (quoting H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 209 (1967)). For
additional history and a discussion of policies underlying this principle of lenity,
see id. at 347-48.
79. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132-33.
80. For a discussion of how the alleged underlying objectives are contrary
to statutory language, see infra, notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
81. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132-33 (Congress "instructed the Sentencing Coin-
890 [Vol. 36: p. 877
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law to the contrary. 82 Third, the court's discussion of policy state-
ments8 3 goes beyond the clear, unambiguous language of those policy
statements. The court attempted to predict what the Commission might
have done had it considered drug rehabilitation, rather than determin-
ing whether the Commission had in fact considered drug rehabilitation
in promulgating the Guidelines. 84
A. Analyzing the Pharr Court's Decision
1. Underlying Objectives
There are three reasons why the Third Circuit erred in concluding
that Congress intended to shift away from rehabilitation.8 5 First, Con-
gress mandated that underlying objectives may not be considered in de-
termining whether a departure from the Guidelines is warranted 86 when
it explicitly stated that "only the sentencing guidelines, policy state-
ments, and official commentary of the Commission" are to be consid-
ered when making such a determination.8 7 The Pharr court's reliance
on alleged underlying objectives of the Guidelines was misplaced, be-
cause the court failed to cite the Guidelines, policy statements or official
commentary in support of its proposition that the Guidelines represent
a shift away from rehabilitation. 8 8 In other words, the court's discussion
of the alleged Congressional shift away from rehabilitation is not ger-
mane to a determination of whether drug rehabilitation is a mitigating
circumstance that warrants a downward departure.
Second, the Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Mia-Orosco,89 upon
which the Third Circuit relied to establish this underlying objective, is
not even controlling in the Fifth Circuit as to the issue presented in
mission, not the courts, to determine whether various personal characteristics
should be considered in sentencing." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d))).
82. For a discussion of statutory language and case law that take a defend-
ant's personal characteristics into consideration, see supra note 7, infra note 108,
and accompanying text.
83. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133.
84. For a discussion of the Pharr court's use of policy statements as a pre-
diction of what the Commission might have done, see infra note 116-39 and
accompanying text.
85. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132 ("Congress shifted... away from a system that
attempts to rehabilitate the individual").
86. For a discussion of the statute which forbids a court from relying on
underlying objectives when determining if a departure is warranted, see infra
notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (emphasis added). For the complete text of
§ 3553(b), see supra note 5.
88. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132-33.
89. United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3257 (1989); Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132.
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Pharr.9 0 According to the Third Circuit, Meia-Orosco9 1 supports the
proposition that the underlying objective of the Guidelines was to move
toward a system which "imposes fair punishment and away from a sys-
tem that attempts to rehabilitate the individual."19 2 The Fifth Circuit,
however, cited no primary authority for this proposition in Meia-
Orosco.9 3 Furthermore, in United States v. Lopez, 94 which was decided af-
ter Meia-Orosco, the Fifth Circuit suggested that, while drug dependence
is not ordinarily relevant, there may be "extraordinary addictions"
where a departure would be justified. 95 Thus, the Lopez decision indi-
cated that Meia-Orosco was not controlling in the Fifth Circuit itself on
the issue presented in Pharr.
In addition, a system which attempts to impose fair punishment
would not logically abandon all attempts to encourage and support re-
habilitation.9 6 The Pharr court cited no authority for its subsilentio as-
90. For a discussion of how Mejia-Orosco may not support the underlying
objective that Congress intended a shift away from a rehabilitation system, see
supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
91. Meia-Orosco, 867 F.2d at 218.
92. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132.
93. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d at 218. The Meia-Orosco court cited various
Supreme Court cases to show that before the promulgation of the Sentencing
Guidelines, actual rehabilitation was a factor in sentencing. Id. The court also
cited the maxim "the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the
crime." Id. (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)). The
Fifth Circuit, however, asserted that this "commendable and ambitious ap-
proach ha[s] proven unworkable and unjust." Id. In support of its interpreta-
tion of the role of the Sentencing Guidelines, the Mejia-Orosco court quoted
Senator Edward M. Kennedy: the Sentencing Guidelines are "a comprehensive
and far reaching new approach ... [designed to] reduce the unacceptable dis-
parity of punishment that plagues the federal system, and . . . to assure
sentences that are fair-and are perceived to be fair-to offenders, victims, and
society." Id. (quoting Kennedy, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, FED. B. NEWS &
J. 62, 65 (1985)).
94. United States v. Lopez, 875 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1989).
95. Id. at 1127. The district court judge departed from the applicable sen-
tencing range calculated using the Sentencing Guidelines, a decision based in
part on his findings that Lopez was "a multi-convicted defendant.., and a hero-
ine addict besides." Id. (emphasis omitted). The Fifth Circuit's response was, at
least, an implicit approval of allowing departure from the Sentencing Guidelines
in cases involving "extraordinary addictions." Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded,
however, that the sentencing judge's statement did not "explain why Lopez's
addiction [was] so extraordinary that a departure was justified." Id.
Even though Lopez involved an upward departure, the same analysis would
apply to a downward departure based on drug rehabilitation. One could argue
that a downward departure based on drug rehabilitation may not even require
extraordinary circumstances. Such an argument would be based on the fact that
while drug dependence was explicitly considered by the Commission, there was no
explicit evidence that drug rehabilitation was considered. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H, § 5H1.4 (policy statement).
96. See Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132 ("Congress shifted toward ... fair punish-
ment and away from . . . rehabilitat[ion]"); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (1988).
Section 3553(a)(2)(D) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 mandates that the
sentence imposed "provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
[Vol. 36: p. 877
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sumption that a system of penology that imposes fair punishment and a
system that rehabilitates are mutually exclusive.
Third, the Fifth Circuit's proposition that Congress intended a shift
away from rehabilitation is contrary to the language of the Sentencing
Reform Act 9 7 in which Congress specifically mandated that rehabilita-
tion remain a primary purpose in sentencing.98 As Judge Edward R.
Becker of the Third Circuit stated in an opinion decided prior to Pharr,
"Section 3553(a) requires-as a matter of law-that district courts impose
a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the four
purposes of sentencing set forth in subsection 3553(a)(2)-retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation."-99 This explicit Congres-
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective man-
ner." Id. (emphasis added). The foregoing statute seems to require rehabilita-
tion for the defendant. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 75 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3220, 3258 (requiring sen-
tencingjudges to consider four purposes of sentencing: rehabilitation, retribu-
tion, incapacitation and restitution, before sentencing a defendant). While there
were some compromises made while promulgating the Guidelines, all efforts at
rehabilitation have not been extinguished. See generally Breyer, supra note 1, at 8-
31 (Guidelines rest on compromises, however, compromises did not foreclose
all rehabilitative efforts).
97. For a discussion of how the proposition that Congress intended to shift
away from rehabilitation is contrary to the Sentencing Reform Act, see infra
notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of Congress's mandate that rehabilitation remain a pri-
mary purpose in sentencing, see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
99. United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 276 (3d Cir. 1989) (BeckerJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). Judge Becker
noted that any sentence imposed which is greater than necessary to meet the
four purposes is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988), is appealable under
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) (1988) and reversible under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(0(1)
(1988). Id. (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a) (1988) provides:
(a) APPEAL By A DEFENDANT.-A defendant may file a notice of appeal
in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentencing if the
sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentenc-
ing guidelines; or
(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline
range to the extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term of
imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the maximum es-
tablished in the guideline range, or includes a more limiting condition
of probation or supervised release under section 3563(b)(6) or (b)(1 1)
than the maximum established in the guideline range; or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guide-
line and is plainly unreasonable.
Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(0 (1988) provides:
If the court of appeals determines that the sentence-
(1) was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incor-
rect application of sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the
case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the
court considers appropriate;
(2) is outside the applicable guideline range and is unreasonable or
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sional recognition regarding the importance of rehabilitation in sentenc-
ing goals' 0 0 emasculates the proposition that Congress intended a shift
away from a rehabilitative system of penology.' 0 '
Judge Becker further asserted that a sentencing judge has an obliga-
tion to depart downward from the applicable Guideline range when he
or she believes the minimum sentence would be greater than necessary
to meet the four purposes of sentencing. 10 2 Admittedly, he noted that
"section 3553(a) requires departures only when a refusal to depart
would result in a sentence plainly unreasonable in light of the statutory
requirement that sentences imposed be sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to meet the four purposes of sentencing."' 0 3 Nevertheless, it
is interesting to recognize that, in addition to bolstering the proposition
that Congress intended to maintain rehabilitation as a sentencing
goal, 10 4 the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 may actually compel a court
was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable, it shall state specific reasons for
its conclusions and [remand for further sentencing proceedings];
(3) is not described in paragraph (1) or (2), it shall affirm the sentence.
Id.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988). The text of the statute provides:
(a) FACTORS To BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE.-The court
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with
the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in
determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines that are issued by the Sentenc-
ing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1) and that are in effect
on the date the defendant is sentenced;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commis-
sion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2) that is in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar con-
duct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
Id. (emphasis added).
101. See Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132 ("Congress shifted toward . . . fair punish-
ment and away from ... rehabilitat[ion]").
102. Denardi, 892 F.2d at 276-77 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
103. Id. at 277 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988).
[Vol. 36: p. 877894
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to issue a downward departure where the minimum sentence is greater
than necessary to further this goal of rehabilitation of the defendant.' 0 5
2. Personal Characteristics of the Defendant
In support of its contention that the system has moved away from
rehabilitation, the Third Circuit relied on the Congressional mandate
"that personal characteristics should not ordinarily affect sentencing on
an individual basis."' 0 6 However, the operative words "not ordina-
rily,"'0 7 indicate that Congress certainly contemplated some extraordi-
nary situations where the personal characteristics of the defendant are to
be considered.' 0 8 Even the Third Circuit conceded that Congress has
105. Denardi, 892 F.2d at 276 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); T.W. HUTCHINSON & D. YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRAc-
TIcE 384-88 (1989). "The phrase [sufficient, but not greater than necessary], on
its face, seems clear and unambiguous-the court must impose a sentence that is
not greater than necessary in order to serve the [four] purposes of sentencing."
T.W. HUTCHINSON & D. YELLEN, supra, at 385. As previously indicated, rehabili-
tation is one of these four purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (1988).
There is a lack of any legislative history explaining the phrase in § 3553(a).
T.W. HUTCHINSON & D. YELLEN, supra, at 384-85. This may be "because the
phrase is quite plain in what it requires." Id. at 385.
Since the plain language of section 3553(a) authorizes a court to im-
pose a sentence no greater than necessary to comply with the purposes
of sentencing, there would have to be, it would seem, a clear and strong
indication in the legislative history that Congress did not mean what
the language compels. There does not appear to be any such indica-
tion in the legislative history.
Id. "Finally, even assuming arguendo that section 3553(a), applied literally,
would enable courts to circumvent the guidelines, that result follows from lan-
guage that Congress drafted and enacted." Id. If that language brings about
undesirable consequences, then it is up to Congress to amend the provision. Id.
For a more detailed discussion of whether § 3553(a) requires a court to de-
part, see id. at 384-90.
106. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132. The Third Circuit cited 28 U.S.C. § 994(e)
(1988) which provides: "The Commission shall assure that the guidelines and
policy statements . . . reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the
education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities,
and community ties of the defendant. Id.
107. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132.
108. United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
"[T]he Commission expressly acknowledged the need in the 'atypical' case for
invocation of the departure power to give appropriate effect to personal charac-
teristics." Id. The Rodriguez court cited the Second Circuit's approval of depar-
ture and stressed that upward as well as downward departures are warranted for
personal character. Id. The court presented an example of how Al Capone's
prosecution would have been an appropriate case for upward departure. Id.
The Rodriguez court cited numerous cases involving departure from the guide-
lines based on personal characteristics:
United States v. Barone, 89 Cr. 301 (CLB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1989)
(departure upward because guidelines did not consider gravity when
perjury is willfully committed by defendant who is high-ranking public
official in community); United States v. Stehmah, 1 Fed. Sent. R. 292
(M.D. Pa. 1988) (departure upward because guideline range did not
1991] 895
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not completely eliminated consideration of personal characteristics by
enacting a uniform sentencing scheme.' 0 9 The Pharr court, however,
asserted that the Commission, rather than the courts, should decide
which personal characteristics may be considered in sentencing."10 This
statement by the Pharr court would foreclose district courts from consid-
ering any personal characteristics not considered by the Commission.
Such a result would be at odds with the prevailing case law and statutory
authority. " ' I
The Sentencing Reform Act explicitly provides that the district
court must impose a sentence consistent with the Guidelines "unless the
court finds there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence differ-
ent from that described. ' 12 The above language, combined with the
Commission's candid statement that it could not consider all potential
grounds for departure," 13 contradicts the Pharr court's assertion that the
consider gravity when drug crime is committed by the community phar-
macist with full knowledge of the harm he is causing to community);
United States v. Hon, 2 Fed. Sent. R. 84 .. .(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (down-
ward departure because of family responsibilities of defendant); United
States v. Gonzales, 2 Fed. Sent. R. 81 . . .(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (family ties
justify downward departure); United States v. Pipich, 1 Fed. Sent. R.
120, 688 F. Supp. 191 (D. Md. 1988) (departure downward justified by
employment record-military service); United States v. Kopp, 1 Fed.
Sent. R. 123 (D.N.D. 1988) (downward departure because of youth and
immaturity of defendant); United States v. Grodeman, 1 Fed. Sent. R.
38 .... (N.D. Ga. 1988) (probation instead of imprisonment based on
personal characteristics of defendant); United States v. Haigler, 1 Fed.
Sent. R. 34 (D. Minn. 1988) (downward departure because of personal
circumstances of defendant).
Id. at 1121-22.
109. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132 ("Congress has not completely foreclosed con-
sideration of defendants' individual characteristics").
110. Id. The Pharr court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988). For the full
text of § 994(d), see supra note 56. The Third Circuit explained that "the Com-
mission included in the guidelines characteristics that relate to the defendant as
a criminal, such as criminal history, but rejected purely personal characteristics,
such as his mental and emotional conditions." Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133 (citing
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H, § 5H1.3); SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H, § 5H1.3 (policy statement). For a list of
district court holdings of departures unrelated to the defendant as a criminal,
see United States v. Harrington, 741 F. Supp. 968, 976 n.8 (D.D.C. 1990).
111. For a discussion of how case law and statutory language allow a district
court to consider the defendant's personal characteristics in determining if de-
parture is warranted, see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
113. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. K, § 5K2.0 (policy
statement) provides:
Any case may involve factors in addition to those identified that have
not been given adequate consideration by the Commission. Presence
of any such factor may warrant departure from the guidelines, under
some circumstances, in the discretion of the sentencing judge. Simi-
[Vol. 36: p. 877896
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district court may consider only those personal characteristics which
have already been considered by the Commission."l 4 Furthermore, the
circuit courts have generally decided that the district courts have wide
discretion in determining whether mitigating circumstances exist which
have not been adequately considered by the Commission and therefore
constitute grounds for a departure. 1 15
3. Policy Statements
a. Policy Statement 5H1.4
The Third Circuit further relied on a policy statement which pro-
vides: "Drug dependence ... is not a reason for imposing a sentence
below the guidelines."' 16 The Pharr court read this statement to include
drug rehabilitation. 1 7 Yet, as the court noted, policy statements are
simply meant to provide guidance and are not binding. 81 8 In addition,
the statute addressing departures was modified by the Sentencing Act of
1987.1'9 The original statute provided:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds
that an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was
not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission in
formulating the guidelines and that should result in a sentence
different from that described.1 20
The modified statute provides:
larly, the court may depart from the guidelines, even though the reason
for departure is listed elsewhere in the guidelines (e.g., as an adjustment
or specific offense characteristic), if the court determines that, in light
of unusual circumstances, the guideline level attached to that factor is
inadequate.
Id.
114. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132.
115. United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 601 (5th Cir.) ("The court's
discretion to depart from the Guidelines is broad."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 175
(1989); United States v. Sturgis, 869 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1989) ("In Correa-Var-
gas we emphasized the 'wide discretion' accorded district court [judges] .... );
United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988) (section 5K2.0
"gives a district court wide discretion in determining which circumstances to
take into account in departing from the Guidelines").
116. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133; SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt.
H, § 5HI.4 (policy statement).
117. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133. Specifically, the Pharr court stated: "We read
policy statement 5H1.4 to mean that dependence upon drugs, or separation
from such a dependency, is not a proper basis for a downward departure from
the guidelines." Id. (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at 133 n.6. While the policy statements are not binding, 18 U.S.C.
3553(b) (1988) specifically allows the policy statements to be considered in de-
termining whether the Commission adequately considered a circumstance. Id.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. III 1985) (amended 1987).
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The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Commission in formulating the guidelines that should re-
sult in a sentence different from that described. 12 1
The modification of this statutory provision to include the words "of a
kind, or to a degree" expands the meaning of what constitutes a "miti-
gating circumstance which may be taken into consideration by a court"
and indicates that Congress realized that the district courts need wide
discretion to accurately determine whether a departure is warranted. 12 2
Hence, even if the Commission considered drug rehabilitation, which
the Pharr court asserted it did by providing that drug dependence is an
improper basis for downward departure, a downward departure might
still be warranted if the Commission did not consider the circumstances
to the degree present in Pharr.12 3
A possible argument is that drug rehabilitation is in fact a "drug
dependence circumstance" of a kind or degree already considered by
the Commission.124 This rationale was adopted by the Pharr court.125
Yet, if the Commission had adequately considered this "drug depen-
dence circumstance" to the degree present in Pharr, the Commission
needed only to mention drug rehabilitation expressly in the same policy
statement that addresses drug dependence. 126 The Commission's fail-
ure to mention drug rehabilitation permits a persuasive argument to be
made that the Commission did not adequately consider the circum-
stance of drug dependence to the necessary degree. If the Commission
had considered drug rehabilitation under circumstances similar to those
in Pharr, it is reasonable to assume it would have stated this explicitly in
one of the policy statements.
At best, the Pharr court's conclusion that policy statement 5HI.4
encompasses both drug dependence and drug rehabilitation is an edu-
cated opinion of what the Commission might have done had it consid-
ered drug rehabilitation. At worst, it is the Third Circuit's opinion of
what the policy statement should have stated. Neither opinion would be
in accordance with Congress's mandate that the proper determination
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
122. For a discussion of the statute controlling departures being modified,
see supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how circuit
courts believe wide discretion is needed, see supra note 115 and accompanying
text.
123. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133; SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt.
K, § 5K2.0 (policy statement).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
125. Pharr 916 F.2d at 132.
126. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H, § 5H1.4 (policy
statement).
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of whether a downward departure is warranted rests on whether the
Commission, in fact, considered the particular circumstance in
question. 12 7
Congress, by modifying the statute, appears to have granted the
district courts more discretion to depart from the Guidelines. 12 8 The
modified statute, as well as the absence of any specific direction from
the Commission, appears to be in conflict with the Pharr court's
conclusions. 12 9
b. Policy Statements 5H1.2 and 5H1.5
The Pharr court also relied upon two additional policy statements in
asserting that the Commission had considered and rejected a defend-
ant's efforts at self-improvement as a basis for a downward departure.' 3 0
First, the court noted that the Commission had, for the most part, re-
jected a defendant's efforts to improve himself through education and
his efforts to maintain steady employment. 13 1 The Third Circuit as-
serted that drug rehabilitation was self-improvement, analogous to edu-
cation and maintaining a steady job. 132 However, the court neglected to
mention that both policy statements 5H1.2 and 5H1.5 provide that such
factors should "not ordinarily" warrant a downward departure. 133 By im-
127. 28 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). For the complete text of this statute, see
supra note 5.
128. For a discussion of the modified statute, see supra notes 119-123, and
accompanying text.
129. There is validity to the Third Circuit's concern over rewarding drug
addicts for being addicted. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133. However, the downward
departure addresses drug rehabilitation, not drug addiction. Moreover, it is un-
likely that there will be an influx of criminals making sure that they have previ-
ously been dependent on drugs and are since rehabilitated so that they might
receive a downward departure at sentencing.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H, §§ 5H1.2, 5H1.5
(policy statements) (emphasis added). Section 5HI.2 provides:
Education and vocational skills are not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines, but the extent to
which a defendant may have misused special training or education to
facilitate criminal activity is an express guideline factor. See § 3B1.3
(Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill). Neither are educa-
tion and vocational skills relevant in determining the type of sentence
to be imposed when the guidelines provide sentencing options. If, in-
dependent of consideration of education and vocational skills, a de-
fendant is sentenced to probation or supervised release, these
considerations may be relevant in the determination of the length and
conditions of supervision for rehabilitative purposes, for public protec-
tion by restricting activities that allow for the utilization of certain skill,
or in determining the type of length of community service.
Id. ch. 5, pt. H, § 5H1.2 (policy statement) (emphasis added). Sentencing
Guideline, Section 5HI.5 provides:
Employment record is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
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plication, there must be extraordinary circumstances which would war-
rant a downward departure.' 3 4 Therefore, relying upon these policy
statements to forbid any departure for all instances of self-improvement,
including drug rehabilitation, would be erroneous.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit's analogy between a policy state-
ment regarding education and employment and drug rehabilitation' 3 5 is
a prediction of what the Commission may have done, not a determina-
tion of whether the Commission adequately considered drug rehabilita-
tion. If the Commission wanted to include drug rehabilitation in a
policy statement, it could have easily stated this intention explicitly. The
Commission made references to education and employment in two sepa-
rate policy statements.' 3 6 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that it
would have made an explicit reference to drug rehabilitation in another
policy statement had it considered such a circumstance. It appears un-
likely that the Commission, having stated that a defendant's efforts at
education and employment should not ordinarily be considered a cir-
cumstance that would warrant a downward departure,' 3 7 also meant
that drug rehabilitation should never be considered.13
8
Determining if departure is proper depends on whether the Com-
mission adequately considered drug rehabilitation, not what the Com-
mission would have done had it considered drug rehabilitation.' 3 9 The
analogy of education and employment to drug rehabilitation is only a
prediction of how the Commission would have considered drug rehabili-
tation. Therefore, it should not be included in the analysis of whether
sentence should be outside the guidelines or where within the guide-
lines a sentence should fall. Employment record may be relevant in
determining the type of sentence to be imposed when the guidelines
provide for sentencing options. If, independent of the consideration of
employment record, a defendant is sentenced to probation or super-
vised release, considerations of employment record may be relevant in
the determination of the length and conditions of supervision.
Id. ch. 5, pt. H, § 5H1.5 (policy statement) (emphasis added).
134. T.W. HUTCHINSON & D. YELLEN, supra, note 105 at 368-74. "The use
of 'ordinarily' implies that if the circumstances are extraordinary, the Commis-
sion recommends that the court consider the factor." Id. at 369.
135. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133.
136. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, ch. 5, pt. H, §§ 5H1.2, 5H1.5
(policy statements).
137. Id.
138. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133. The Third Circuit stated: "We find that in the
circumstances of this case, the defendant's efforts to improve himself through
drug rehabilitation are analogous" to "the defendant's efforts to improve him-
self through education or his ability to maintain steady employment." Id. It
appears the court may have left an opening for circumstances that are not pres-
ent in this case. However, the court based its finding on the fact that drug reha-
bilitation is self-improvement, and it is difficult to imagine a defendant's effort at
drug rehabilitation which would not constitute self-improvement. Id.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
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drug rehabilitation is a mitigating circumstance which- would warrant a
downward departure.
B. Effects of Incarceration on Drug Rehabilitation
At the end of its opinion, the Third Circuit again relied on the al-
leged Congressional shift away from rehabilitation to show that the ef-
fect of incarceration on Stanley Pharr's drug rehabilitation is an
inappropriate ground for a downward departure.' 4 0 However, Con-
gress has stated that "the court, in determining the particular sentence
to be imposed, shall consider.., the need for the sentence imposed...
to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant."' 4' The in-
terruption of Pharr's drug rehabilitation, therefore, should be a factor in
the district court's attempt to prevent any future harm to the public in
accordance with the congressional directive.' 4 2 Under the Guidelines,
this potential harm would be a legitimate factor to be considered by the
court. 143
Additionally, as addressed above, Congress has explicitly stated that
only the Guidelines, policy statements and the official commentary may
be considered in determining whether a circumstance was adequately
taken into consideration by the Commission and therefore whether a
downward departure is warranted.' 4 4 The Third Circuit did not cite,
nor did the author find, any of these sources to support the court's con-
clusion that the effect of imprisonment on a defendant's drug rehabilita-
tion is a circumstance that had been adequately considered by the
Commission. 14 5 It appears, therefore, that the Commission did not
consider the effect of imprisonment on a defendant's drug rehabilitation
efforts. Consequently, such an effect should allow a downward depar-
ture within a district court's discretion.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the underlying objective of a
"shift away from a rehabilitative system of penology"' 14 6 is errone-
140. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133. A technical point could be made, however,
that the effect of imprisonment on drug rehabilitation has nothing to do with
Stanley Pharr's rehabilitation as a thief. It is arguable, therefore, that a shift
away from a rehabilitative system applies to Stanley Pharr's thievery, but not his
drug use. This argument exists because Stanley Pharr was convicted of being a
thief, but not a drug user. The Third Circuit's reliance on a shift away from
rehabilitation, supposedly for the crime committed, may not be applicable to
Stanley Pharr's drug rehabilitation.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(c) (1988).
142. Brief for Appellant at 6-7, United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129 (3d
Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1284). Throughout the district court's opinion, the judge
expressed concern for the possible ill effects on the community if Stanley Pharr's
drug rehabilitation was interrupted. Id.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(c) (1988).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
145. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133.
146. Id.
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ous.
1 4 7 Consequently, any findings based on this underlying rationale
are also erroneous. Accordingly, a district court may consider the effect
of imprisonment on the defendant's drug rehabilitation efforts in deter-
mining whether to depart from the applicable sentencing range.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion illustrates that there is no definitive way
to determine whether the Commission considered drug rehabilitation
when it promulgated the Guidelines.t 4 8 The disagreement between the
federal courts ' 4 9 in their interpretation of the Guidelines, as well as the
Third Circuit's reliance on underlying objectives and policy state-
ments, 150 underscores the latent ambiguity as to the question of
whether drug rehabilitation warrants a downward departure from the
Guidelines. ' 5 '
The practical effect of the Pharr decision for defense attorneys is
that, at least until this issue is resolved by the United States Supreme
Court, the Third Circuit will not allow drug rehabilitation to serve as a
mitigating circumstance warranting a downward departure. Further-
more, it appears that if "drug-related offenses" were involved, drug re-
habilitation would be even less likely to be grounds for departure in
light of Van Dyke. If the Third Circuit adopts Van Dyke, an attorney
would not only have to persuade the Third Circuit that the Pharr court's
reasoning was flawed, but also have to persuade the court to reject the
Van Dyke reasoning, which the Pharr court declined to consider until the
question was "squarely before" it.1 52
147. For a discussion of how the underlying objective that Congress in-
tended a shift away from rehabilitation is erroneous, see supra notes 85-105 and
accompanying text.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) provides that "[i]n determining whether a
circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider
only the sentencing guidelines, policy statement, and official commentary of the
Sentencing Commission." Id. (emphasis added). This limited authority pro-
vides no guidance as to whether the drug rehabilitation was adequately
considered.
149. For a discussion of the conflicting views on the issue presented in
Pharr, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
150. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132 ("We base our holding on the underlying objec-
tives of the sentencing guidelines and the policy statements articulated by the
Sentencing Commission."). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reliance on
these objectives and statements, see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
151. If the Sentencing Guidelines were not ambiguous then there would be
no dispute in the federal courts and consequently, no reason to discuss underly-
ing objectives and policy statements. The above discussion illustrates the con-
flicts and ambiguities present in the Guidelines with respect to whether a district
court has the discretion to depart downward when drug rehabilitation by the
defendant is involved. For a discussion of why any ambiguity should be resolved
in the defendant's favor, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
152. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132 (court did not address issue of whether drug
rehabilitation was already considered under acceptance of responsibility provi-
902 [Vol. 36: p. 877
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The Third Circuit's decision in Pharr limits the district court's dis-
cretion in deciding whether to depart from the applicable sentencing
range. The Pharr court asserted that it was improper for a district court
to substitute its opinion for that of the Commission.' 5 3 However, hav-
ing relied upon material outside of the congressional mandate' 54 and
having used policy statements to predict what the Commission would
have done,' 5 5 the Pharr court substituted its own opinion, not only in
place of the Commission's, but also in place of a clear congressional
mandate.
Jim McHugh*
sion in Guidelines when defendant committed a "drug-related offense"). An-
other argument, not addressed in Pharr, is whether the Guidelines, while
constitutional on their face, may be unconstitutional as applied to a specific de-
fendant. For a discussion of the possible constitutional questions, see Weigel,
supra note 3, at 88. A due process or equal protection argument may prevail in
some district courts, as well as circuit courts, until the Supreme Court addresses
the issue. Id.
153. Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132.
154. 18 US.C. § 3553(b) (1988). For a discussion of why the underlying
objectives relied upon by the Pharr court are contrary to congressional mandate,
see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of why the Pharr court's analysis of policy statements
is only a prediction of what the Commission would have done, see notes 116-39
and accompanying text.
* I would like to thank my wife, Colette M. McHugh, for her significant
contributions to this Casebrief. She provided immeasurable support and gui-
dance throughout its preparation. Colette, Thank You!
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